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I. INTRODUCTION
The Americans with Disabilities Act was enacted in 1990 as a comprehensive
scheme in which previously discriminated against classes would be
guaranteed fair treatment in employment as well as other settings. The Act
protects those with both physical and mental disabilities. With respect to
certification for the practice of law, the Act has almost unique significance as
the accommodations the Act calls for arguably clash with state bar standards
of competence both in legal education and mental fitness for certification. These
clashes tend to stem from two major situations -accommodation of the learning
disabled student who maynot be able to complete course work or examinations
in the same time as others do and reluctance of prospective attorneys to answer
questions regarding past mental health treatment on bar examination
applications. This note will give an overview of current litigation regarding
these issues and summarize what uniform decisions have been made with
respect to these situations.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
The purpose of enacting the Americans with Disabilities Act was to provide
a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimin-
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ation against individuals with disabilities. 1 Congress found that individuals
being discriminated against on the basis of a disability usually had no form of
legal recourse, thus propounded to provide clear, strong, consistent,
enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with
disabilities. Congress invoked its authority under the Fourteenth Amendment
and its power to regulate Commerce to address the major areas of
discrimination faced day-to day by people with disabilities. 2 The Americans
with Disabilities Act (hereinafter "ADA") contains five separate Titles
addressing the needs of individuals with disabilities, the first three will be
analyzed in relation to this issue of certification for the practice of law.
The ADA begins with definitions that apply to the Act as a whole. This
includes a definition of disability. With respect to an individual, the term
"disability" means one of three things. First, an individual has a disability if a
physical or mental impairment 3 substantially limits one or more of the major
life activities of such individual. An individual must prove that he or she has
a physical or mental impairment, that substantially limits performance of a
major life activity, such as walking, seeing, hearing, breathing, speaking,
performing manual tasks, caring for self, learning, or working.4 The term
"impairment" may include physiological disorders, or any mental or
psychological disorder.5 Second, an individual is regarded as being disabled if
he or she has a record of such an impairment.6 Having a record of such an
impairment means has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a
mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities. 7 Third, an individual is disabled under the statute if he or she is
142 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (1994).
21d.
342 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994). A physical or mental impairment means any
physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss
affecting one or more of the following body systems: Neurological, muscoskeletal,
special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular,
reproductive, digestive, genitourinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine. 28
C.F.R. § 35.104 (1994). An impairment also includes contagious and noncontagious
diseases and conditions, but does not include homosexuality or bisexuality. Id.
428C.F.R. § 35.104 (1994). For the purposes of this note, being denied an opportunity
to be certified or compete in a law school program would substantially limit the major
life function of both learning and working.
5W. Sherman Rogers, The ADA, Title VII, and the Bar Examination: The Nature and
Extent of the ADA's Coverage of Bar Examinations and an Analysis of theApplicability of Title
VII to Such Test, 36 How. L.J. 1 (1993). Other disabilities covered under the ADA are
AIDS, cosmetic disfigurement, dyslexia, and other learning disabilities. Stress may also
be covered by the ADA if the condition is so severe as to be considered disabling by a
psychiatrist.
642 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
728 C.F.R. § 35.104 (1994).
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regarded as having such an impairment. 8 The phrase" regarded as having an
impairment" can mean three different things-that an individual has an
impairment that does not limit a major life activity but that is treated as
constituting such a limitation, that an impairment substantially limits a major
life activity only as a result of the attitudes of others towards the impairment,
or an individual may not have an impairment as defined under the statute, yet
is treated as having such an impairment. 9
A. Title I
Title I of the ADA applies to "covered entities." Under the statutory
definition, covered entities include an employer, employment agency, labor
organization, or joint labor-management committee. 10 The general rule states
that no "covered entity" shall discriminate against a "qualified individual with
a disability" because of the disability of such individual in regard to job
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees,
employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment. 11 A"qualified individual with a disability" is defined
under Title I as an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment
position that such an individual holds or desires. This definitions gives the
employer deference as to what is to be considered essential. However, included
as a means of discrimination is an employer's failure to provide a reasonable
accommodation necessary to allow an individual with a disability the ability
to perform the functions of the job.12
Title I specifically prohibits medical examinations and inquiries, stating that
a "covered entity" shall not conduct a medical exam or make inquiries of a job
842 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994). The third meaning of disability under the statute -
regarded as having an impairment - is perhaps the most troublesome definition for
challenges to bar application questions. By answering in the affirmative to a specific
inquiries into mental health treatment or mental health history, the applicant may be
unfairly regarded as having an impairment and their application may be treated
differently than those who answered in the negative. This differential treatment may be
viewed as a clear violation of the ADA.
928 C.F.R. § 35.104 (1994).
1042 U.S.C. § 12111(2) (1994).
1142 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994).
1242 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(a) (1994). As defined under the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9),
reasonable accommodation may include:
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to
and usable by individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassign-
ment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of examina-
tions, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers
or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with
disabilities.
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applicant as to whether such applicant is an individual with a disability or as
to the nature or severity of such disability.13 However, a "covered entity" may
condition employment by requiring a medical exam after an offer of
employment has been made to the applicant and prior to the commencement
of employment duties, if all employees are subject to the same process and the
results are kept confidential in accordance with Title 1.14 Furthermore,
examinations and inquiries must be job related and consistent with business
necessity.15
B. Title II
Title II applies to "public entities." This means any State or local government,
any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a
State or local government.16 Title II states in pertinent part that no qualified
individual with a disability may be subject to discrimination by a public entity,
be excluded from participation in, or be denied the benefits of, the services,
programs or activities of any department, agency, or other instrumentality of
a state.1 7
Using similar language as Title I, Title II applies to "qualified individuals
with a disability." An individual is "qualified" if he or she can meet the "essential
requirements" of the testing or licensing entity "with or without reasonable
modifications to rules, policies or practices, or the provision of auxiliary aids
and services.' 18 In construing this statutory language, the Department of
Justice has issued regulations that indicate that Title II is applicable to
professional certification and licensing programs. It states in pertinent part:
(6) A public entity may not administer a licensing or certification
program in a manner that subjects qualified individuals with
disabilities to discrimination on the basis of disability, nor may a public
entity establish requirements for the programs or activities of licensees
1342 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(A) (1994).
1442 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3) (1994).
1542 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A) (1994). Also, a covered entity may conduct voluntary
medical examinations, including voluntary medical histories, which are part of an
employee health program available to employees at that work site. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(d)(4)(B) (1994). The information obtained in medical inquiries or examinations,
regarding the medical condition or history of any employee are subject to strict
confidentiality requirement. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(C) (1994).
1642 U.S.C. § 12131(1) (1994).
1742 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994).
1842 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (1994). It is important to note that the term "qualified
individual with a disability" means an individual with a disability who meets the
essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in
programs or activities provided by a public entity. Id.
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or certified entities that subject qualified individuals with disabilities
to discrimination on the basis of disability.
19
(8) A public entity shall not impose or apply eligibility criteria that
screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or any
class of individuals with disabilities from fully and equally enjoying
any service, program, or activity, unless such criteria can be shown to
be necessary for the provision of the service, program, or activity being
offered.
20
While many individuals can meet the educational requirements and
qualifications for certification, difficulties arise in professional testing
procedures and circumstances that provide a specific challenge to an
individual's disability. The testing agency is obligated by law to provide that
individual with a modification that will allow the individual to complete the
examination.21
As in Title I, failing to provide a qualified individual with a disability a
reasonable accommodation in rules, practices, or procedures administrated by
the state is included in the definition of "discrimination" in Title II.22 Therefore,
if the individual is "qualified with a disability" and there exists a "reasonable
accommodation" that will modify the rules, policies or procedures of the
examination, the state agency must comply. A failure to comply would be a
violation of the ADA.
C. Title III
Title III applies to places of public accommodation and any private entity
that owns or operates that place of public accommodation. For the purposes of
Title III, some private entities are considered places of public accommodation.
Included in the definition of private entities which are considered places of
public accommodation are undergraduate, postgraduate private school, or
other places of education.23 The general rule of Title III is that no individual
shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal
enjoyment of the privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of
public accommodation by anyone who operates a place of public
accommodation. 24
Title III specifically prohibits the imposition of eligibility criteria that screen
out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability from enjoying the
1928 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(6) (1994).
2028 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(8) (1994).
2128 C.F.R. § 36.309 (1994). Specific requirements pertaining to the administration of
a test are contained in the regulations in Title Ill of the ADA.
2242 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994).
2342 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(j) (1994).
2442 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994).
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accommodations being offered. 25 Furthermore, a failure to make reasonable
modifications in policies, practice, or procedures, when such modifications are
necessary constitutes discrimination.26
The Department of Justice prescribed regulations that attempt to implement
Title III. Section 36.309 of these regulations specifically addresses the place and
manner or alternative accessible arrangement that must be afforded
individuals with disabilities.2 7 These criteria are applicable to administrating
examinations and courses related to applications, licensing, and certification
of professionals. The United States Justice Department's position is that Title
III covers bar examinations.28 Private and public entities have a requirement
to provide individualized modifications in order that a student or bar applicant
can achieve a fair result with regard to that individual's disability.
Title III of the ADA specifically requires private entities to provide reasonable
accommodations tailored to the examinee's individual needs when offering
examinations or courses. 29 Furthermore, a private entity offering the
examination must assure it is selected and administered so as to best ensure
that "the examination results accurately reflect the individual's aptitude or
achievement level or whatever other factors the examination purports to
measure."3
2542 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i) (1994).
2642 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1994). Other specific types of discrimination that are
expressly prohibited by Title Il state in pertinent part:
(iii) a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that
no individual with a disability is excluded, denied service, segregated
or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the
absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demon-
strate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature
of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation
being offered or would result in an undue burden;
(iv) a failure to remove architectural barriers, and communication
barriers that are structural in nature, in existing facilities, ... , where
such removal is readily achievable; and
(v) where an entity can demonstrate that the removal of a barrier
under clause (iv) is not readily achievable, a failure to make such
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommoda-
tions available through alternative methods if such methods are
readily achievable.
42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii)-(v) (1994).
2728 C.F.R. § 36.309 (1994).
2 8 Rogers, supra note 5, at 8.
2 9 Deborah Piltch, et al., The Americans With Disabilities Act And Professional Licensing,
17 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 556 (1993).
301d. at 557.
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D. Applicability
The ADA does not explicitly address possible violations with respect to every
aspect of the certification for the practices of law. Title II broadly prohibits
discrimination by disallowing state certification programs from denying the
benefits of those programs or activities of a public entity, i.e. a State bar
examining committee. This would directly apply to the character and fitness
portion of the certification process. 31 Title III's application provides more
insight into specific accommodations that should be made in selection and the
administration of testing followed by law schools and the bar examination
process. While Title I does not directly include law schools and public agencies,
its similar purpose and language in the employment context allows an
analogous application to this issue and provides pertinent insight into
reasonable accommodations and the way problems and issues should be
addressed. Together, all three Titles provide the necessary groundwork to
challenge the appropriateness of making accommodations in professional
school settings and the current conflicts between subjective competence
standards and the relationship to the fitness of practicing law.
III. LEARNINC DISABILMES
A. Application of the ADA
In 1967, the National Advisory Committee promulgated the following
definition of "specific learning disability":
[A] disorder in one or more of the basic psychological processes
involved in understanding or in using language, spoken or written,
which may manifest itself in an imperfect ability to listen, think, speak,
read, spell or do mathematical calculations. The term includes such
conditions as perceptual handicaps, brain injury, minimal brain
dysfunction, dyslexia, and developmental aphasia. The term does not
include children who have learning problems which are primarily the
result of visual, hearing, or motor handicaps or mental retardation or
emotional disturbance or of environmental, cultural, or economic
disadvantage.
32
A learning disability effects an individual's ability to comprehend and
analyze information as routinely as the normal student Leaming disabilities
31Rogers, supra note 5, at 7. The author of this article, W. Sherman Roger, suggests
that Title 11, due to its overly broad language and lack of specific prohibitions, only
applies to the characterand fitness portion of the bar certification procedures. Moreover,
Rogers purports that Title m is limited to the selection and administration of licensing
and professional tests. He reaches the conclusion since the Department of Justice
provides specific regulations as to accommodation that should be afforded to
individuals with disabilities while taking examinations.
32 M. Kay Runyan & Joseph F. Smith, Jr., Identiying and Accommodating Learning
Disabled Law School Students, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 317,318 (1991).
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range from dyslexia to visual impairments and hearing problems. One effect
that a learning disability may have on a student is that the individual may need
additional time to complete examinations or timed events due to the inability
to reasonably comprehend questions and relay correct answers in a short
amount of time. In order not to discriminate against these individuals under
the ADA, a public or private entity administering an examination must provide
these individuals with an accommodation that would allow such individual a
fair chance to succeed on the examination.
Title III mandates that reasonable accommodations be made for test takers.
To that effect, Title III outlines reasonable accommodations that may be given
by examiners administering examinations. The first suggestion is that the
required modification to the examination may include changes in the length of
time permitted for the completion of the examination and adaptation of the
manner in which the examination is given.3 3 Second, providing auxiliary aids
and services, including taped examinations, interpreters or other effective
methods of making orally delivered materials available to individuals with
hearing impediments, Braille or large print examinations and answer sheets or
qualified readers for individuals with visual impairments or learningdisabilities.34
Title III also outlines reasonable modifications that are necessary to ensure
that the place and manner in which a course is given are accessible to
individuals with disabilities. Similar to examinations, required modifications
may include changes in length of time permitted for the completion of a course,
substitution of specific requirements, or adaptation of the manner in which the
course is conducted. 35 Also, auxiliary aids and services required are the same
that are required for the adaptation of an exam.36
When making a determination as to what sort of accommodation should be
made, the focus should be on the individual. Title III makes it very clear that
in determining what accommodation should be made, the public entity should
first consult with the individual requesting the accommodation. 37 The
difficulty with this provision is determining what accommodation should be
made and for whom. Title III makes suggestions for "traditional" types of
disabilities, i.e. making doors wide enough for wheelchair accessibility;
however, it would be overly burdensome to expect that every disability be
assigned a boilerplate accommodation. The need to personalize
accommodations has exam givers walking on eggshells. What is enough extra
time for an individual with dyslexia? If the exam giver creates a standard time
3328 C.F.R. § 36.309(b)(2) (1994).
3428 C.F.R. § 36.309(b)(3) (1994).
3528 C.F.R. § 36.309(c)(2) (1994).
3628 C.F.R. § 36.309(c)(3) (1994).
37piltch, supra note 24, at 558.
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extension for all disabilities, the failure to accommodate a particular individual
with a disability would be discriminatory.
All of these concerns spill over into the law school setting. Law school
examinations call for an immediate application of a wealth of information, all
in a short period of time. The examinations are centered on one's ability to read,
analyze and comprehend the issues of a certain subject or area of law. The
ability to succeed and perform well is grounded in the ability to discover the
most issues and rapidly apply those issue to the law. Due to the difficulty of
grading, time becomes an important factor that weeds out the successful from
the not so successful. Should the time factor be extended for qualified
individuals with disabilities so that the playing field is leveled? Or does the
time limitation successfully accomplish its goal in preparing future students
for success in the legal field regardless of the presence of a disability?
B. Recent and Current Litigation
The requirement to accommodate is the law, but how far can this extend
without destroying the foundations of the academic setting? This issue was
addressed in the case of Wynne v. Tufts University School of Medicine.38 In Wynne,
a medical student who failed out of medical school later claimed that he failed
due to a learning disability.39 The student challenged that the school
discriminated against him by requiring him to take multiple choice
examinations.40
After the district court initially granted summary judgment in favor of Tufts,
the First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for further
factual submissions.41 The court stated that in order for the university to
overcome the discrimination challenge, it had to submit to the court evidence
that it consciously carried out its obligation to seek a suitable means of
reasonably accommodating a person with a disability. This included
submitting a factual record that the university officials considered alternative
means, their feasibility, cost, and effect on the academic program, and came to
a rationally justified conclusion that alternatives were not appropriate because
they would lower academic standards or fundamentally alter the nature of the
program.42
38932 F.2d 19 (1st Cir. 1991). The procedural history in the Wynne case is somewhat
complicated.In the initial district court case, Tufts filed a motion for summary judgment,
which the court denied. Tufts appealed the decision. The First Circuit Court of Appeals
states the standard of proof that Tufts needed to meet in order that summary judgment
be granted and remanded the case. Producing the required information, Tufts renewed
its motion for summary judgment. The motion was granted and the plaintiff appealed.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district courts decision.
391d. at 20.
401d. at 22.
411d. at 28.
42 Wynne, 932 F.2d at 28.
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On remand the District Court of Massachusetts granted Tufts renewed
motion for summary judgment. The court held that the use of multiple choice
examinations did not illegally discriminate against the student. The court
stated that the school met their burden of showing that alternative means were
considered and correctly concluded they were not practicable.43 The medical
school considered alternative means, but reasonably concluded that the
available alternatives would result in either a lowering of academic standards
or would require substantial program alterations.44 The university advocated
that the multiple choice format was important because the format required
students to quickly read and analyze information. Furthermore, modem
diagnostic and treatment procedures require physicians to be able to read and
assimilate complex data and immediately render important decisions in
stressful situations. In the judgment of the school, multiple choice
examinations best met those demands of the profession.45 The district court
also pointed to the fact that Tufts reasonably accommodated the student by
allowing him to retake the first year curriculum, by funding notetakers and
tutors for him, and by taping the plaintiff's lectures. Tufts also permitted the
plaintiff to retake exams in an untimed setting.46 The First Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the district court's decision.47
In a more recent case, D'Amico v. New York State Bd. of L. Examiners,48 the
United States District Court for the Western District of New York granted a
preliminary injunction which compelled the Board to provide the plaintiff bar
applicant with certain requested accommodations when she was to sit for the
New York State Bar Exam. The plaintiff, D'Amico, suffered from a severe visual
disability. She had marked myopia and partial amblyopia.49 As a result, the
plaintiff had an extremely difficult time reading, finding it near impossible to
read normal-sized print. Reading for extended periods of time caused blurring,
tearing, and a burning sensation, and she had to take frequent breaks to rest
her eyes.5 0 After graduating from law school in 1992, she registered to take the
July bar exam. In anticipation of her need for an accommodation to take the
43 Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Medicine, No. 88-1105-Z, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2629
*2 (D. Mass. 1992).
4 4 d. at "1.
45Runyan, supra note 32, at 326.
46 Wynne, No. 88-1105-Z, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2629 at *3.
4 7Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Medicine, 976 F.2d 791, 792 (1st Cir. 1992).
48813 F. Supp. 217 (W.D.N.Y 1993).
4 9 d. at 218. The plaintiff's vision was so severely damaged, that although she wore
glasses, her medical condition could not be corrected to achieve 20/20 vision. With
visual aids, her vision was 20/50 in the right eye and 20/70 in the left eye. This caused
theplaintiff to suffer from ocular fatigue and a "lazy eye" condition, which was marked
by dimness of her vision. Id.
501d.
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exam, she requested that she be permitted various accommodations. The Board
agreed and she was provided with a large print exam. Additionally, she was
permitted to bring her own lamp and a straight edge that would enable her to
focus on specific lines of text. Lastly, she took the exam in a separate location
(with one other student) in the presence of a proctor.51 After she failed the first
examination, she made similar requests for accommodation for the second
exam, and included a request to stretch the bar examination time from two
days to four days long. The Board denied this request although it granted the
requests that she made earlier. The Plaintiff challenged the Board's denial of
allowing her the "reasonable accommodation" of four days to take the
examination.52
The dispute in D'Amico related solely to the extent to which reasonable
accommodations should be given. In analyzing the plaintiff's situation the
court first looked to whether or not the plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm
by not having an extension of time.53 The court found this to be the case as it
employed a "but for" analysis. The court stated that "but for plaintiff's disability
and the Board's reluctance to allow her to take the exam over a four day period,
she would have an equal opportunity to be admitted to the practice of law."54
The court then determined that in accordance with the purpose and
language of the Act, the plaintiff must show that (1) she was disabled, (2) that
her requests for accommodations were reasonable, and (3) that those requests
were denied.55 The focal element was reasonable accommodation. The court
stated that there was a delicate balance that must be made in determining
whether requested accommodations were reasonable, in order to provide the
disabled individual on equal footing and not give them an unfair advantage.
The court relied extensively on the opinion of the plaintiff's medical doctor
who specifically opined that the four day accommodation was critical to the
plaintiff's ability to compete equally with others taking the examination and
held that all of the plaintiff's requests for accommodation were reasonable.56
51 D'Amico, 813 F. Supp. at 218.
521d. at 219.
531d. at 220. The plaintiff claimed that she would suffer irreparable harm because it
would be extremely difficult for her to take and pass the bar without the
accommodation. She maintained that she would lose extensive time she invested in
preparation, would suffer serious setback in her efforts to chose a profession, would
face the prospect of taking another bar exam, and will suffer the professional stigma of
failure because of her medical disability. Id.
54 D'Amico, 813 F. Supp. at 220.
55 Id. at 221.
56 d. at 222. The plaintiff's doctor found that the daily time schedule of the bar
examination exacerbated her visual impairment and that extensions of time on exam
days did not effectively give the plaintiff an equal opportunity to compete. Rather, the
plaintiff needed shorter time periods spread out over more days. Id.
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The decision of the court requiring that the plaintiff be accommodated with
a four day examination period established the willingness of courts to protect
individuals with disabilities by providing them with sufficient leeway to
compete on the bar examination. This protection was afforded on the
recommendations of the plaintiff's physician and his opinion as to what
accommodations must be made. While the court stated that the physician did
not have the final word on determining what was reasonable, the court gave
great weight to the physician's opinions as to the nature of the accommodations
required for his patient.
The Delaware Supreme Court reached a similar result in In re Petition of Kara
B. Rubenstein.57 The plaintiff in Rubenstein was in a unique situation in that she
continued after three unexplained failed attempts at the bar exam, to work as
a clerk in the Superior Court and later obtained a position as Assistant Deputy
Attorney General. These employers attested to the fact that she was more than
competent and able to practice law, and that they found her failure to pass the
bar exam inexplicable.58 After the three failures, Rubenstein sought an expert's
explanation for her inability to pass the exam. The analysis resulted in the
diagnosis of a learning disability, which was attributable to her linguistic,
sequential processing learning style. This learning disability greatly affected
her ability to process information presented all at once compared to her ability
to develop a problem sequentially, which explained her success in practicing
law.59
Rubenstein applied for permission to take the bar examination a fourth time.
She also requested that a reasonable accommodation of unlimited time be given
to her. This request for additional time was granted for the essay portion, but
was rejected for the Multistate section. 60 Rubenstein failed the Multistate
section. Rubenstein brought an action to ask the court to compel the state of
Delaware to certify her as able to practice law regardless of her fourth failed
bar examination.61
The court held that plaintiff's request for unlimited time was a reasonable
accommodation that the Board should have granted. The court stated that the
Board, which was an instrumentality of the court, constituted a public entity
within the meaning of 'litle 11.62 Consequently, as a public entity, the Board was
required to make reasonable accommodations to prevent the de facto exclusion
which may occur when disabled but otherwise qualified individuals were
57637 A.2d 1131 (Del. 1994).
58 d. at 1133.
591d.
601d. at 1134.
61Rubenstein, 637 A.2d at 1134.
621d. at 1136. The court found that Title H1 had no specific standards for the
administration of bar examinations or other professional licensing test and then looked
to the specific regulations enunciated in Title III for guidance.
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limited from fully participating in the examination process due to standard
administrative procedures. 63 The court then looked to Title III for specific
guidance regarding the administration of examinations.
In accordance with the purpose of the ADA-to place those with a disability
on equal footing and not to give them an unfair advantage-the court felt
consistent with Rubenstein's disability needs, that unlimited time should have
been granted to her.64 The court again relied on the opinion of the expert that
examined Rubenstein and discovered that she had a learning disability,
determining that the failure to give her this additional time was manifestly
unfair.65 The court, in assessing an appropriate and equitable remedy, waived
the requirements that Rubenstein pass both sections of the bar examination. It
ruled that her ability to pass one section and her competence to practice law,
attested to by her legal employers, was enough to waive the formal
requirements. 66
Both the D'Amico case and the Rubenstein case display a leniency that the
court is willing to apply to cases where a reasonably requested accommodation
has been made and rejected by the test administering body. The emphasis was
placed on a case by case analysis of the individual's specific needs to be
accommodated. The uniformity of these decisions sends a message to testing
entities that they must take the time and make a specific tailoring of their testing
procedures to not only account to disabled individuals as a whole, but for the
specialized needs of those with particular disabilities.
The current problems in this area center on the conflict with the goals of state
bar certification procedures enacted to ensure that applicants who are later
certified are competent to practice law. The practice of law is a high-stressed,
high-pressure professional field and the ability to act under these conditions is
vital to the ability to fairly represent another party with some degree of
competence. A state has an interest in assuring that those practicing law within
its boundaries are competent. With this in mind, an analysis of individuals and
their disabilities, particularly within the practice of law, should not result in
favoring disabled individuals over others. Rather, strict rules regarding
modifications should be adhered to in order to protect a state's interest in
competence. Deference to doctors' decisions of what is reasonable regarding a
specific learning disability should be strictly scrutinized and challenged in
order to ensure that a high standard of competence and fitness to practice law
is upheld. This is necessary in order to establish an adequate balance between
accommodations that are legitimately necessary under the ADA, and the
competency and fitness requirements called for by the legal profession.
63 Id.
64Id. at 1138.
65Rubenstein, 637 A.2d at 1139.
66 d. at 1140.
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IV. MENTAL DISABILITIES
A. Application of the ADA
Like learning disabilities, mental disabilities also receive varying degrees of
protection under the ADA. One aspect of this protection is that employers may
not discriminate against employees on the basis of mental disabilities. Evidence
of this is the strict rules regarding pre-employment inquiries or medical
examinations. Employers are prohibited from asking about mental disabilities
on employment applications, inquiring about mental disabilities in an
interview setting, and subjecting an applicant to medical examinations before
hiring.67 Nevertheless, after an offer of employment has been made, an
employer may condition the employment on passing a medical examination.68
While these protections are very clear in Title I of the ADA, it is in dispute as
to whether such protection extends to applications for professional
certification.
In order to be certified by a state to practice law, an individual must complete
a bar application and must pass the bar examination. Included on most bar
applications is a general question concerning whether or not the applicant has
been treated for or has sought treatment for any mental health problems. While
the purpose of the application is to assess an individual's health and fitness to
practice law, the inquiry can be interpreted as intruding on one's privacy and
creating a discriminatory tool on which certification decisions may be based.
This type of questioning may elicit a truthful answer of the type of treatment
one has received or it may work to prevent a prospective certification candidate
from seekingnecessary treatment for common anxieties or mental disturbances
brought about due to the high intensity that law school and the legal profession
create. These inquiries have been challenged under the ADA in recent litigation
in a number of states.
B. Recent and Current Litigation
In Ellen S. v. Florida Board of Bar Examiners,69 plaintiffs were seeking
admittance to the Florida Bar and claimed that certain inquiries of the Florida
Bar Examiners violated the American with Disabilities Act. Question 29 on the
Florida Bar application asked whether the applicant had ever sought treatment
for a nervous, mental, or emotional condition, has ever been diagnosed as
having such a condition, or has ever taken psychotropic drugs of any kind.70
67See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(A) (1994).
68See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (1994).
69859 F. Supp. 1489 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
70 d. at 1491. Question 29 of the application to the Florida Bar reads as follows:
29. Consultation with Psychiatrist, Psychologist, Mental Health
Counselor or Medical Practitioner
a. Yes No Have you ever consulted a psychiatrist, psychologist,
mental health counselor or medical practitioner for any mental,
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An affirmative answer to any of the above mentioned questions required the
subsequent disclosure by the applicant of the names and addresses of each
consulting physician as well as the beginning and ending dates for the
consultations. 71 Furthermore, each applicant was required to execute
"Authorization and Release" forms, to release all records and rights of
confidentiality. The plaintiff claimed that the Florida Bar would not certify an
individual to practice law in Florida if in the past such individual had consulted
a mental health professional unless he or she agreed to reveal to the Board the
facts and circumstances of the consultation. 72
In denying the defendant's motion to dismiss, the court in Ellen S. centered
on the extra investigations that an affirmative answer to question 29 provoked,
rather than the inquiry itself. The court disagreed with the Board's argument
that no discrimination had occurred because the plaintiff has not been denied
a license to practice, and stated that the subsequent inquiries discriminate
against individuals with disabilities by subjecting them to additional burdens
based on their disabilities. 73
Another state to address this issue is Minnesota. The Dean and Faculty
members of the University of Minnesota Law School, the William Mitchell
College of Law and the Hamline University Law School petitioned for an order
of the court directing the State Board of Law Examiners to delete questions from
the Application for Admission to the Bar of Minnesota which required
information about mental health treatment. 74 The petitioners argued that the
questions should be removed as a matter of public policy, since they deter law
students from seeking mental health counseling and unduly invade privacy.75
Even though the court was unsure of the ADA's application to the questions
at issue, the court issued an order, as a matter of public policy, to remove the
questions from the application. The court stated that the prospect of having to
nervous or emotional condition, drug or alcohol use? If yes, state
the name and complete address of each individual you consulted
and the beginning and ending dates of each consultation.
b. Yes No Have you ever been diagnosed as having a nervous, mental
or emotional condition, drug or alcohol problem? If yes, state the
name and complete address of each individual who made each diagnosis.
c. Yes No Have you ever been prescribed psychotropic medication? If yes,
state the name of each medication and the name and complete
address of each prescribing physician. Psychotropic medication
shall mean any prescription drug or compound effecting the mind,
behavior, intellectual functions, perceptions, moods, or emotions,
and includes anti-psychotic, anti-depressant, anti-manic and anti-
anxiety medications. Id.
71id.
72Ellen S, 859 F. Supp. at 1491.
73 1d. at 1494.
74 1n re Petition ofFrickey, 515 N.W.2d 741, 741 (Minn. 1994).
75 1d.
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH
answer the mental health question may cause many law students to forego
much needed counseling, and for the most part, the questions relating to
conduct could elicit the information necessary to enable the court to protect the
public from unfit practitioners. 76
Broad mental health questions were also addressed in In re Underwood.77 In
Underwood, the Maine Supreme Court ruled that broad questions about mental
health on state bar applications violate the ADA. 78 The court reasoned that "the
requirement to answer the questions discriminates on the basis of disability
and imposes eligibility criteria that unnecessarily screen out individuals with
disabilities." The judge did not rule out inquiries altogether, by stating that it
was permissible for the board of bar examiners to fashion other questions more
directly related to behavior that could affect the practicing of law without
violating the ADA.79 Again an emphasis was placed on the extra burdens that
were placed on post affirmative answers to the questions, such as authorization
for release of information.
Despite this trend, in October of 1994, the United States District Court for
the Western District of Texas surprisingly ruled that bar examiners may ask
questions about mental health history without linking their inquiries to an
ability to perform the job. In Applicants v. Texas Board of Law Examiners,80 Judge
Sam Sparks held that it was "ludicrous to propose that protecting individuals
with disabilities from discrimination can only be accomplished by prohibiting
a state from directly investigating and assessing an applicant's emotional and
mental fitness to practice law." The court stated that the Board has a duty to
protect the public. 81 While the court commented that broad based questions in
76 ld.
77No. BAR-93-21, 1993 WL 649283 (Me., Dec. 7, 1993).
78 MaineJudge isFirst to Ban Broad Mental Health Queries by Bar Examiners, 4 DISABILITY
COMPLIANCE BULL.,Jan. 20, 1994, at 4.
791d.
80No. A 93 CA 740 ss, slip op. (W.D. Tex. Oct. 10, 1994); Mental Health Questions on
Licensing Application Withstand ADA Challenge, 5 DISABILrrY COMPLIANCE BULL., Oct. 27,
1994, at 1 [hereinafter Mental Health Questions]. The question that withstood the ADA
challenge in Texas are most likely to set the national boilerplate. The approved questions
state in pertinent part:
Within the last ten years, have you been diagnosed with or have
you been treated [for] bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, paranoia, or
any other psychotic disorder?
Have you, since the age of 18 or within the last 10 years, which-
ever period is shorter, been admitted to a hospital or any other facility
for treatment of bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, paranoia or any other
psychotic disorder?
Applicants who answer in the affirmative to the question must
submit to the board details of the treatment and names of treating
physician.
Id. at 10.
81Mental Health Questions, supra note 80, at 1.
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other jurisdictions violated the ADA, Texas' questions complied with the law
because they focused on only those mental illnesses that pose a potential threat
to the applicant's present fitness to practice law. The court reasoned that
inquiry into past diagnosis and treatment of the severe mental illnesses, such
as bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, paranoia, or any other psychotic disorder,
was necessary to provide the Board with the best information possible to assess
the functional capacity of the individual.82
Another state that has addressed the possible discriminatory effects of bar
application inquiries is the state of Virginia. In Clark v. Virginia Board of Bar
Examiners,83 the applicant refused to answer two questions inquiring about
treatment and counseling for mental or nervous disorders. The Board advised
Clark that a refusal to answer the questions made her Character and Fitness
Questionnaire incomplete, which made her ineligible to sit for the bar exam.84
The Board allowed Clark to sit for the bar, without prejudice to its position that
she would have to answer the questions before being allowed to practice law
in the state of Virginia. Clark successfully passed the bar examination, but her
refusal to answer the two questions stopped her from being licensed.85
In Clark, the court initially ruled that it failed to have jurisdiction to interfere
in the Board's proceedings to determine Clark's fitness to practice law.86
Furthermore, the court stated that the plaintiff did not have a disability as
defined under the ADA. 87 However, in a Motion to Reconsider, the court
retracted its position on both of these issues and the case is currently pending.88
8 2 1d. at 10.
83861 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Va. 1994).
84 1d. at 514.
851d.
861d. at 516. In reaching its decision that it lacked jurisdiction, the District court
reasoned that the licensing board was simply requesting that the Plaintiff finish her
application by answering the two questions. Since the board had not made any decision
about the Plaintiff's fitness to practice law, the court determined that it did not have
jurisdiction to interfere in the state board's administrative proceedings. Accordingly,
the court noted that she could bring her ADA claim in the context of state admission
proceedings by petitioning the Supreme Court of Virginia.
87 Clark, 861 F. Supp. at 517. The disability that the Plaintiff claimed she had was
"major depression recurrent." The plaintiff claimed that it substantially limited one or
more of her major life activities, specifically that it affected her ability to concentrate, act
decisively, sleep properly, orient herself, and maintain social relationships. The court
found that the ADA did not cover such common difficulties and that the Fourth Circuit
has expressly rejected attempts to define disabilities so broadly. The court referred to
the plaintiff's expert deposition testimony that stated by the third year of law school,
fortypercent of law students reported significantly elevated depression levels. The court
concluded that protecting this "disability" under the ADA would debase the high
purpose of the statutory protections available to those truly handicapped. Id.
88 Clark v. Virginia Bd. of Bar Examiners, No. 94-211-A, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12256
(E.D. Va. Aug. 31,1994).
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Other litigation concerning the discriminatory effects of bar application
questions concerning mental treatment or history is pending in several other
states. For instance, a suit was recently filed in the state of Connecticut. Richard
Roe v. Connecticut Bar Examining Committee has been filed in the United States
District Court for the District of Connecticut and contends that the plaintiff's
history of mental disability is completely irrelevant to the practice of law.89 The
plaintiff was unwilling to answer questions about past mental illness. He
claimed that the questions unnecessarily intruded on his privacy and were in
violation of the ADA. The plaintiff advocated that the very fact that those types
of questions were being asked, suggests that the examining committee has the
stereotypical assumption that being treated for mental or emotional illness,
affects one's ability to function as an attorney.90 The examining committee
believed that its questions were legally proper and relevant to a determination
of fitness of bar applicants.91
A few commentators have addressed the need for uniformity concerning
mental health inquiries that can be made to assess the health and fitness of a
bar applicant. However, an agreement on whether it is permissible under the
ADA to ask these types of questions does not seem close at hand. In a recent
article, Mental Health Inquiries: To Ask, or Not to Ask - That is the Question,92
Thomas A. Pobjecky stated that such inquiries were needed to determine a
qualified applicant, as "it is necessary for the protection of the public to screen
out would-be lawyers who are not emotionally stable to fulfill the duties and
responsibilities of a member of the legal profession."93 He commented that the
best source of accurate, detailed information concerning an individual's mental
fitness was from the applicant, as a balanced and thorough identification of
information was best achieved by a combination of self-reporting and third
party contacts. 94 Pobjecky contended that the information gathered was only
used to gain insight into an applicant's fitness to practice law and was not used
to discriminate against those applicants with a disability.95
While Pobjecky's reasoning seems logical, it appears to be inconsistent with
the thrust of the ADA - to avoid burdening those with histories of disabilities.
In The Constitution, the Disability Act, and Questions About Alcoholism, Addiction,
and Mental Health, Charles L. Reischel asserted that no basis appears for a rigid
"no inquiry" rule, however, where there is insufficient justification a general
89Bar Exams, Medical Boards are Putting ADA to the Test, 4 DISABILITY COMPLIANCE
BULL, July 7,1993, 1. (This case has not yet been decided.)
901d. at 6.
911d.
92Thomas A. Pobjecky, Mental Health Inquiries: To Ask, or Not to Ask - That Is the
Question, B. ExAmiNER, Aug. 1992, 31.
931d. at 33.
941d. at 36.
951d.
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prohibition against mental health inquiries may be found.96 Reischel
commented that because the information gathered was used to focus further
investigations, individuals with disabilities were more closely scrutinized.97
Reischel advocated that the questions should be removed from bar applications
because serious mental health problems have almost always surfaced in
response to other questions (about debt, crimes, arrests, litigation, discipline,
etc.). Since the purpose behind the fitness inquiry is to uncover any risks as to
competent job performance, the inquiry should be limited to evidence of a
mental condition's interference with relevant activities. This type of
information is almost always apparent through other information sought by
the committee.98 Therefore, inquiries as to mental health counseling are
irrelevant in determining an individuals health and fitness to practice law.99
Agreeing that mental health inquiries violate the ADA, Phyllis Coleman and
Ronald A. Shellow in their article Ask About Conduct, Not Mental Illness, recently
challenged bar examiners and medical boards to comply with the ADA.OO
They contended that by asking these questions, boards were implying that
applicants with a history of treatment for mental illness were regarded as
"having a disability."''1 Therefore, any inquiries must comply with the ADA's
requirements that questions be linked to the essential functions of the
profession. Since no proof tied the information gathered to the essential
functions of the profession, Coleman and Shellow asserted that the questions
should altogether be eliminated for bar applications.102
With the number of suits challenging bar examination questions under the
ADA progressively increasing, a need for a uniform decision is imperative. The
only case that has provided any guidance concerning this issue is the
aforementioned Texas case Applicants v. Texas Board of Law Examiners.103 In
reaching its decision on the merits, the court came to the conclusion that states
may ask questions about mental health history without linking those questions
to the ability to practice the law. However, the court did concur that broad-
96Charles L. Reischel, The Constitution, the Disability Act, and Questions About
Alcoholism, Addiction, and Mental Health, B. EXAMINER, Aug. 1992, 10, at 19.
971d. at 20.
9 8 1d.
9 9 1d.
100 Phyllis Coleman and Ronald A. Shellow, Ask About Conduct, Not Mental Illness: A
Proposal for Bar Eraminers and Medical Boards to Comply with the ADA and Constitution, 20
J. LEGIS. 147 (1994).
1011d. at 165.
1021d. at 166.
103Mental Health Questions, supra note 80, at 10.
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based mental health inquiries were violative of the ADA and only permitted
inquiries that were tailored to discover major illnesses.104
The Texas Board decision may provide other states with boilerplate language
for general questions that do not violate that court's interpretation of the ADA,
however, whether the decision adequately answered the issue remains to be
seen. The court's reliance on a state's interest to protect the public seems
paradoxical. Even general inquiries may violate public policy, as they may
deter law students from seeking needed mental health counseling or any
counseling for fear of not being certified to practice law. An applicant's failure
to get treatment or reporting that treatment was received ironically defeats the
states policy of protecting the public, as states may be certifying individuals
who intentionally denied treatment and whose condition has subsequently
worsened. This may create a legitimate question of competency.
V. CONCLUSION
The quest for the certification for the practice of law creates numerous
problems regarding compliance with the Americans With Disabilities Act.
While students with learning disabilities have a right to reasonable
accommodations that level the competitive playing field, drawing the line on
what is reasonable is often too difficult. Courts have given great deference to
doctors' opinions of what is reasonable regarding a specific learning disability.
However, with this deference, the focus of ensuring that a high standard of
competence and fitness to practice law is upheld is blurring. A closer union
between accommodations that are legitimately necessary under the ADA, and
the competency and fitness requirements called for by the legal profession is
needed.
Mental health inquiries during the bar application process also create
potential compliance problems with the ADA. The cases and commentators
assessing whether a bar application process may inquire into an applicant's
mental health, demonstrate that courts are not as willing to go as far for
protecting those with alleged mental disabilities from discrimination, as they
are for protecting those with alleged learning disabilities from discrimination.
This is an odd contradiction. If courts are under the impression that they are
protecting the integrity of the profession by allowing questions about mental
health on bar applications, it would seem logical to assume they would find
extensions of time to take bar exams impermissible as that, too, would tend to
compromise the integrity of the profession. This, however, is not the case.
While the difference between the protection of learning disabilities and the
protection of mental health disabilities on bar applications appears to center
around the making of accommodations, the inconsistency in logic detracts
from the vital function of the certification process--to screen applicants for
competency and fitness to practice law. Rather, challenges of certification
procedures under the ADA have shifted the focus to fear of litigation. As Judge
1 0 4 Id.
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Sparks stated, prohibiting the state from directly investigating and assessing
an applicant's emotional and mental fitness to practice law would be ludicrous.
Both not being able to directly investigate mental fitness and providing
highly deferential accommodations have a potentially disastrous effect in the
legal community, as avenues for assessing competency are continually being
narrowed. Learning and mental disability protection under the ADA in the
quest for the certification of law must be refocused in favor of competency.
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